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"Fault should be a requirement for punishment."
Benjamin N. Cardozo'
WEAPONS TO FIGHT INSIDER TRADING IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
A CALL FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 16(B) 2
by
Michael H. Dessent*
Does it make legal sense that a corporate officer who bought and sold
shares in his own company within a six-month period at an accounting loss, with
no intent to deceive, can be sued to give up her nonexistent "profits"? Should the
so-called aggrieved plaintiff be entitled to recover if he was not even a shareholder
at the time of the defendant's stock trades and had never even heard of the
corporation until his lawyer told him to buy that stock?3 Should ajudgment for that
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). Then Chief Judge
Cardozo (later U.S. Supreme Court Justice), explained the position of the prestigious New
York Court of Appeals in the context that criminal statutes should require some knowledge
that a criminal act was morally wrong:
In the light of all these precedents, it is impossible.., to say that there is
any decisive adjudication which limits the word "wrong" in the statutory
definition to legal as opposed to moral wrong. The trend of the decisions
is indeed the other way. The utmost that can be said is that the question
is still an open one. We must, therefore, give that construction to the
statute which seems to us most consonant with reason and justice.
People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 338 (1915).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) [hereinafter Section
16(b)].
* Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Sunny Nassim and Mary-Ellen Norvell for their excellent assistance with
this article.
3 A case illustrating this principle is Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
In this decision the defendant was ordered to pay $300,000 to the corporation for
the "profits" he earned over several six-month periods. Id. at 52. In actuality he had
incurred a taxable loss of $400,000. The court followed Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943), which stated that to give section 16(b) its full effect, the
calculation would be the shares with the lowest purchase price, matched against those with
the highest sale prices. Id. at 237 & n. 11. Thus, they would ignore any losses which may
be actualized. Id. at 238.
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plaintiff be allowed if he purchased only one share of stock in that corporation just
before filing suit? What if he is seeking only a negligible share of the recovery
himself, while his attorney in the action can receive several thousand dollars?
4
Finally, is it legally "right"5 that over 66 years of comprehensive securities
litigation involving Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 and its
Rule l0(b)5,7 have led to well-defined standards of such unique concepts of "duty,"
"breach," "scienter," "causation," "reliance," "misappropriation" and "materiality"
for insider trading,8 but none of that matters in a § 16(b) case?
It is the position of this paper that § 16(b)9 needs to be repealed. That
statute puts blame on innocent people and essentially legalizes champerty.' °
Adequate standards have been created by which culpability for insider trading can
be determined and society protected.' Equally important, the high likelihood of
champerty, and the total lack of merit and standing of most individual plaintiffs,
coupled with the Supreme Court's recent U.S. v. O'Hagan12 decision, give Congress
a marvelous opportunity to repeal the statute while still carrying out its original
legislative purpose.
1 3
Sections I and II of this paper consist of an examination of Section 16(b)
4 Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 972 (1956).
' For judicial definitions of that word in a criminal context, see Tenement House Dept. v.
McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 163 (1915); People on Inf. of Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-
Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25 (1918).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
8 For the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision discussing these terms, see United States
v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
10 "A bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the
party's claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds." NATHAN M.
CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION
273 (1996). Also relates to general term of "maintenance"- "maintaining, supporting, or
promoting the litigation of another." See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (6th ed.
1991).
11 See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
12 id.
13 The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously struggled over the propriety of strict liability
in criminal law. See e.g., United States v. Parks, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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and the intent of Congress in establishing this section. It further discusses the
policy behind Congress' allowance of non-owners of the security at the time of the
"short swing" transaction to establish standing to sue by acquiring the security even
after the alleged transaction has taken place.
Sections III through VI discuss the abuses by attorneys in making large
profits in connection with Section 16(b) cases. In this section it will be shown that
the practice of receiving such large attorney's fees is actually long-standing.
Gollust v. Mendell14 is the most recent case addressing this issue. However, there
is a history of cases which date back as early as the 1940s. This section will also
consider the issues of contingent fee agreements and champerty and how these
compensation practices may facilitate the self interest of attorneys who initiate
Section 16(b) suits. Lastly, this section will deal with the issues of solicitation and
whether attorneys who find someone to purchase the security of the "issuer" (such
as friends or family) for the sole purpose of initiating a law suit are acting ethically.
Section VII discusses possible solutions to the problems associated with
Section 16(b) actions, including other alternatives to the problems associated with
instituting a Section 16(b) suit. One such solution may be to amend Section 16(b)
to permit, as plaintiffs, only those who are shareholders at the time of the alleged
trade. In the alternative, the United States v. O'Hagan decision,15 may offer a
solution, thereby determining that there may no longer be a need for Section 16(b).
It concludes with a focus on a contemporary view of the intent and purpose of
Section 16(b), and discusses what measures could be taken to cure the ongoing
problems associated with this Section.
I. THE FACTUAL SETING
Imagine two different hypotheticals which might occur in today's stock
markets. In the first, a corporate officer in a publicly traded corporation obtains
confidential, non-disclosed material information regarding an upcoming merger of
his business. He decides that this would be the perfect opportunity to make a
sizable profit by purchasing stock in his company, the price of which he knows is
likely to soar when news of the proposed merger is disclosed publicly.16 The officer
14 501 U.S. 115 (1991), affig 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990).
15 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
16 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.05 202.06 (The
Exchange 1992).
202.05 Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
20001
AKRON LAW REVIEW
information which it might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its
securities. This is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the listing
agreement which the company enters into with the Exchange.
A listed company should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which result
in unusual market activity or price variations.
202.06 Procedure for Public Release of Information
(A) Immediate Release Policy
The normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a
press release. This may be either by telephone or in written form. Any release of
information that could reasonably be expected to have an impact on the market for a
company's securities should be given to the wire services and the press For Immediate
Release....
(B) Telephone Alert to the Exchange
When the announcement of news of a material event or a statement dealing with
a rumor which calls for immediate release is made shortly before the opening or during
market hours (presently 9:30 A.M. to 5.00 P.M., New York time), it is recommended that
the company's Exchange representative be notified by telephone at least ten minutes prior
to release of the announcement to the news media. If the Exchange receives such
notification in time, it will be in a position to consider whether, in the opinion of the
Exchange, trading in the security should be temporarily halted. A delay in trading after the
appearance of the news on the Dow Jones or Reuters news wires provides a period of calm
for public evaluation of the announcement.... A longer delay in trading may be necessary
if there is an unusual influx of orders. The Exchange attempts to keep such interruptions in
the continuous auction market to a minimum. However, where events transpire during
market hours, the overall importance of fairness to all those participating in the market
demands that these procedures be followed.
(C) Release to Newspapers and News Wire Services
News which ought to be the subject of immediate publicity must be released by the
fastest available means. The fastest available means may vary in individual cases and
according to the time of day. Ordinarily, this requires a release to the public press by
telephone, telegraph, or hand delivery, or some combination of such methods. Transmittal
of such a release to the press solely by mail is not considered satisfactory. Similarly, release
of such news exclusively to the local press outside of New York City would not be sufficient
for adequate and prompt disclosure to the investing public.
To insure adequate coverage, releases requiring immediate publicity should be
given to Dow Jones & Company, Inc., and to Reuters Economic Services.
Companies are also encouraged to promptly distribute their releases to Associated
Press and United Press International as well as to newspapers in New York City and in cities
where the company is headquartered or has plants or other major facilities....
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1970, the SEC issued a general release relating to the disclosure of material corporate
developments. See SEC comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate
Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, Exchange Act Release No. 8995, Fed. Sec.
[Vol. 33:4
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purchases the stock. A few weeks later, an appropriate formal announcement about
the upcoming merger is made. As anticipated by the officer, the corporation's stock
price doubles quickly. The officer then sells his newly acquired stock for a multi-
million dollar profit.
In the second hypothetical, a corporate officer, also in a publicly traded
corporation, buys 1000 shares of stock in her company to help fund her child's
education. She purchases that stock for $100.00 per share. Five months later, she
is compelled to sell these shares to meet a medical emergency for the child.
Fortunately, during those five months, the price per share for the corporation's stock
has increased from $100.00 to $175.00 per share. While the officer possessed
knowledge of material, non-public information, she did not base her decision to
purchase or sell on that news.
When comparing these situations, it seems appropriate that the officer in
the first example should be subject to discipline because he was engaging in insider
trading, using material, inside information for his own personal gain. 17 In the
second example, the officer was the beneficiary of a strong market, but never used
her position in the corporation to aid her in personally gaining from the sale of the
stock. Equitably, it does not seem appropriate to punish the latter just because she
had some good fortune. Unfortunately for both parties, Section 16(b) holds them
both liable for all "profits" realized in the transactions. In fact, as is discussed later,
the defendant in the latter case can be found liable for much more monetary
damages than her actual taxable profits, unlike defendants with criminal intent in
Section 10(b) cases."
II. THE POLITICAL SE=TIG
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"9 to deal
with issues relating to the sale and purchase of securities. Section 10(b) of that Act
L. Rep. (CCH) 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970). See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (3d ed., 1996) (citing ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY
OFTHE NEW YORK STOCKEXCHANGE 1935-1975 (1975) and Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism,
Full Disclosure and the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law,
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1473 (1986)).
17 See e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The officer also has Williams Act and mail fraud liability as
well. See e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
s See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).




[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange..
. (b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
However, with no definition of terms or official guidelines as to its use, §
10(b) was little used for a decade. Then Milton Freeman, who created it, speaking
in 1967 at a conference on the codification of the Federal Securities Laws with
Sumner Pike and the recently deceased Louis Loss on the panel, said:
I think it would be appropriate for me now to make a brief
statement of what actually happened when lOb-5 was adopted,
where it would be written down and be available to everybody, not
just the people who are willing to listen to me.
It was one day in the year 1943, 1 believe. I was sitting in
my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a
call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading
and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional
Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president
of some company in Boston who is going around buying up the
stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share,
and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will
be $2.00 a share for the coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I
looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided
it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and
I don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike
486 [Vol. 33:4
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who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That
is how it happened.
Louis is absolutely right that I never thought that twenty-
odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had ever
happened. It was intended to give the Commission power to deal
with this problem. It had no relation in the Commission's
contemplation to private proceedings. Milton Freeman,
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law 793, 922 (1967).
Contrariwise, Section § 16(b) was specifically written as a strict liability
statute intended "to prevent the abuse of the use of inside information by officers,
directors, and more than 10% shareholders. ' 2' The legislature history of this section
reveals that Congress intended it to be the main provision to stop insider trading.2'
Just one year after the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933,22 which
regulated the initial issuance of securities, Congress became alarmed by certain
types of stock trading by officers and directors of public corporations.23 It
concluded that there was a need to restore the integrity of the stock market in order
to encourage participation by the general public.24 Ordinary people who bought and
20 In Freedman v. Barrow, a federal court stated that by enacting the "short swing" profits
provision of this section, Congress recognized that short swing speculation by large
stockholders, officer and directors, all of whom might have access to inside information,
would threaten the goal of section 16(b) "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets," 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Wagman v. Astle, the federal court
stated that the purpose of Section 16(b) was to restore eroded investor confidence in the
integrity of the stock market. 380 F. Supp. 497,501 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Court expressed
the rationale that "it is unfair for some to profit in ways that others cannot." Id.
21 See Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 501.
22 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
23 See Susan A. Wetzel, Comment, New Rule 16b-3, the SEC's Attempt to Aid Insiders by
Revising Rule 16b is Much Ado About Nothing, 24 OHio N.U. L. REv. 125, 128 (1998).
24 Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, stated that the policy behind the creation of Securities
Exchange Act was to "insure a fair and honest market, that is, one which would reflect an
evaluation of securities in light of all available and pertinent data." 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d
Cir. 1943). The court reviewed the background of the section and determined that
"speculation by insiders, officers, directors and principal shareholders was a widely
condemned evil," according to the Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency.
Id. See also Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d
Sess., and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1934. The court concluded that the
only solution which the framers deemed effective for this action was "the imposition of
liability based upon an objective measure of proof." Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 235.
2000]
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sold shares were being disadvantaged by the fact that "insiders"25 were in a position
to find out valuable information concerning their own company's stock before it
was known to the public and use this information to make a profit. Having defined
such public policy, Congress took the step of imposing strict liability upon those
officers, directors and ten percent shareholders who transacted certain "short" sales
of the issuer's securities.26 The end result Congress desired was the elimination of
the unfair practice known as "insider trading.
27
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
While the intent of Congress was the restoration in the faith and integrity
of the stock market, the following issues soon arose in conjunction with the new
Section 16(b). Many of these stemmed from the language used in the section and
others from the interpretations which courts made when defining it.
28
The court cited Mr. Corcoran's testimony, a chief spokesman for the draftsmen and
proponents of the Act, wherein he stated, "You hold the director, irrespective of any
intention or expectation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have
to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to
prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing." Id. The
court confurmed its position by noting that had Congress intended that only profits made by
the misuse of inside information would be recoverable, it would have said so. Id. at 236.
Therefore, because Congress did not limit the recovery to profits gained by the misuse of
information, neither would the Court. See Id. at 237.
25 Initially defined as officers, directors, and those owning over 10 per centum of a
corporation's stock. 15 U.S.C. §78p(a) (1994).
26 See Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1315,1319 (1997).
27 Wetzel, supra note 23, at 127 & n.14, noting that a 1915 New York Times survey showed
that 90% of business executives interviewed admitted to trading regularly in their own
corporation shares. See also HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
2 (1966). However, there is some contrary belief as to the actual intention of Section 16(b).
See generally Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183 (1992) (proposing that Section 16(b) was actually intended to
prevent market manipulation, because insiders have the ability to artificially move stock
prices by trading on their privileged information); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16:
Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991)
(stating that the Act's purpose was to discourage manipulation of corporate affairs to create
opportunities to trade corporate stock profitably, since insiders generally invest for the long
term).
28 Section 16 has two primary subsections which set out its requirements and 3 additional
ones which limit the Section's overall scope. Section 16(a) places requirements on certain
[Vol. 33:4
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Section 16(b) entitles the issuer, or a security holder bringing suit on the
issuer's behalf, to recover short swing profits realized from the purchase and sale
by a subject insider of such issuer's equity securities within a six-month period.29
Basically, it prohibits insiders from making a profit on transactions in their
company's securities when the purchase and sale of the securities both occurred
within a six-month period. Section 16(b) is controlled by an irrefutable
presumption that the profits gained by the insider were produced unfairly.
Therefore, insiders must disgorge any profits realized in this type of short swing
transaction and return the profit to the company. This disgorgement controls
irrespective of the purchasers actual intent.30
Section 16(c) prevents insiders from profiting from downturns in the price
of their corporation's securities by prohibiting short sales "against the box." In a
short sale, the seller does not actually own the stock. Instead, the seller borrows
stock, generally from his or her broker, and sells it in the market. The seller must
at some later time replace the borrowed securities by purchasing replacement
securities in the market. The seller engages in short selling in the hope that the
market price will decline because the replacement securities may be purchased at
a lower price than those initially sold (the borrowed securities), thus creating a
profit. Section 16(d) and Section 16(e) exempt certain transactions from the overall
coverage of Section 16.31
A. Standing
One particular issue was the fact that a person suing to disgorge a "short
statutorily defined insiders to report to the SEC their beneficial stock interests. Section
16(a) defines those insiders which are subject to the requirements as "every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of an
equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section
78(1) of this title (section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934), or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security." Pursuant to Section 16(a), these defined
insiders must file an initial report when their company's securities are registered under
Section 12 or within 10 days after becoming statutory insiders. Following the initial report,
insiders must file transaction reports by the tenth day of the month following any month in
which there has been a substantial change in their ownership, and they must also file annual
statements of beneficial ownership with the SEC. See generally, Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
29 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).
30 See id.
31 Id. §§ 78p(d), 78p(e).
2000]
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swing" transaction did not have to be a shareholder at the time that the alleged
illegal transaction took place.32 The only step the plaintiff had to take in order to
obtain standing was to be an "owner of [a] security" of the "issuer" when he filed
the complaint.33 He did not even have to be a shareholder at the time of the trade.34
Section 16(b) thus still makes it easy for a party to bring an action against
an insider who has violated Section 16(b) for five distinct reasons. Specifically,
Section 16(b) provides that a plaintiff in a Section 16(b) suit must be the owner of
a "security" of the issue corporation.35 A "security" for purposes of Section 16(b)
includes warrants, convertible debentures, bonds, puts, calls, and a variety of other
financial instruments. 36 This expansive determination of what a "security" entails
for purposes of Section 16(b) increases the chances of a party having a means to
achieve standing to bring a suit against an insider.
Second, the plaintiff can be either the "record" or "beneficial" owner of a
subject security.3 7 This point confers standing on a wide array of potential
plaintiffs. Then, the plaintiff need only own the security at the time he institutes the
suit against the insider, not at the time of the purchase and sale by the insider.38
Moreover, there are no restrictions in terms of either the number or
percentage of shares or the value of such securities that must be held by the
plaintiff.39 This plaintiff could purchase one share of stock, allege that there is a
Section 16(b) violation, and properly bring a suit. Finally, case law makes it even
easier by granting attorneys' fees to attorneys who represent successful plaintiffs,
32 See id. § 78p(b).
31 Id. See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and
Regulatory Construction of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 33, 38-55 (1992).
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1994).
35 id.
36 See generally S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
37 See generally Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967). See also
15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1994). See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 709 (3d ed., 1996) (stating that "nowhere in Exchange Act is the concept of
beneficial ownership explicitly defined and therefore its scope has been limited to judicial
interpretation and administrative rulemaking.").
38 See Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
919, (1957); see also Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
'9 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123 (1991).
490 [Vol. 33:4
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thus eliminating the cost of litigation for the plaintiff.'
B. Champerty and its Residue
Other key issues concerning this statute are the use of contingent fees,
champerty and solicitation. A contingent fee is "a charge made by an attorney
dependent upon a successful outcome in the case and is often agreed to be a
percentage of the party's recovery., 41 Champerty is an agreement between an
attorney and his client in which the attorney is essentially the real party in interest
in the client's suit and pays the costs in return for a large portion of the damages
awarded. 42 Startlingly, although champerty is a violation of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility,43 and state law,44 a defense of champerty in a Section
16(b) cause of action is not permitted.45
In a related sense, there also is an issue of solicitation in Section 16(b)
lawsuits. Attorneys who understand the lenient standing requirements may be
inclined to solicit potential clients or, in the alternative, "create" clients to sue for
a Section 16(b) violation. 46 Although solicitation in some respects has been upheld
40 See Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964), affd on reh'g
en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
41 BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (4th ed. 1996). Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367,369 (2d
Cir. 1990) (" absent fraud or overreaching, courts must enforce such private contingency fee
agreements, which are, after all, embodiments of the intentions and wishes of the parties..
. . 11).
42 See generally, 9 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 4286-89 (3d
ed. 1992).
43 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) (1998). Contingent fees are an
exception to Rule 1.80). Id. Rule 1.80)(2). See generally Rule 1.5(c).
44 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 391 & 19, 389 & 3 (3d ed.
1996) (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1999)). "Most statutes are based in
whole or part upon the American Law Institute's Uniform Securities Act. UNIF. SECURITIES
ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509-687 (1985 and Supp. 1988).
4" See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956).
46 Indeed, the plaintiff "shareholder" in several § 16(b) suits was the owner of the newstand
in the plaintiff's attorney's building lobby. One district court held "unbelievable (his) own
testimony that he had cash funds adequate to pay (fees)" noting the lack of any bank
accounts or sign of wealth .... " Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618, 619 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (holding that "in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain" does not warrant First
Amendment protection as does advertising in the Bates case, infra note 48); see also,
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
2000)
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by the Courts, such as in an advertising context,47 a question arises whether it is
appropriate in the context of Section 16(b).
Since Section 16(a) requires that an insider report any trades involving his
company's stock to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is a simple project
for a clerk to comb through these publicly accessible reports in order to find a
"violation." Then the attorney can solicit "a plaintiff," so that, in essence, the
attorney enforces Section 16(b) and receives sizable fees for his work. The
corporation actually pays this fee since it, in theory, has received a "benefit" from
attorney, i.e., the legal services that resulted in the recovery from the insider who
had no culpable intention. Of course, the net profits of the corporation and the
shareholders book value, are reduced by these fees.
Cases have held that the attorney is entitled to a "reasonable" fee for the
services rendered.48 The question is - is that fee justified for the amount of the
work done?
In a typical scenario, the attorney finds both a violation and a plaintiff, and
then writes a demand to the company for the enforcement of Section 16(b). If the
insider returns the profit to the company without further legal action, the attorney
still is entitled to a substantial percentage of the recovery. The plaintiff receives a
minuscule amount in relation to the attorney fees awarded. In one case, the
individual plaintiff received only $1.10, and the bulk of the award went to pay
attorneys fees.4 9
This creates a "misincentive" for the attorney. Obviously there are minor
costs to search through Securities and Exchange Commission records and find a
violation, which should be compensated if there is a recovery for the plaintiff and
the corporation, but should it not be reasonable?
This scenario also perpetuates the public's hostile view of attorneys.
(holding that a lawyer is free to place a newspaper advertisement intended for luring a
specific group of people as her clients).
47 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that there can be no restriction
on truthful advertising and this restriction would be a violation of the Firkt Amendment).
4 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1998) (for
determining "reasonableness"); see also RobertL. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 777 P.2d 394,395-
96 (Okla. 1989) (basing an analysis of the "reasonableness" of attorney fees on twelve
discussed factors).
49 Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956).
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Attorneys appear to have an excessive incentive to litigate merely for the fees
involved; not to right a true "wrong" or help a truly aggrieved plaintiff recover a
loss to which he may be entitled. The public perception of lawyers is already
extremely negative and surveys have shown a consistent dissatisfaction with the
legal profession as a whole.5° This Section 16(b) situation hurts the image of
attorneys and the legal profession in general. It is doubtful that this result was
envisioned by the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
C. Elements of the Lawsuit
Since the 1930's, the federal government has developed a framework of
criminal and civil laws designed to.prevent corporate insiders from profiting in the
securities markets on the basis of nonpublic material information.51 Cases
involving Section 16(b) have generally focused on the definition of "sale" or
"purchase, 5 2 the definition of a "security, '0 3 and what roles in a corporation are
considered "insider positions. 54 Regrettably, there have been only a few cases on
the identity of the plaintiff or the appropriateness of the fees awarded to the
attorneys.55
An initial reading of Section 16(b) leads a reader to believe that Section
16(b) should be an effective tool to deter insiders from trading on non-public
information. The most striking benefit is the fact that Section 16(b) does not
require any proof as to the intent of the purchaser/seller in successfully finding a
violation under Section 16(b). In other words, it is a strict liability statute. 56 The
only proof that the rule requires for a successful prosecution is that the insider
'0 See Barbara Rosen, Simple Things You Can Do Everyday to Improve Your Image, PA.
LAW, Jan. 1994, at 22.
51 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
52 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323-24. The process of starting a suit has a shareholder
of the issuer asking the issuer to require the insider to disgorge the profits. Id. at 1324. If
the issuer fails to do so within 60 days, then the shareholder may file a suite to compel
disgorgement. Id. at 1324-25.
" See generally Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991).
14 See generally Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 38, 69-78.
15 See e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F.Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLuM. L. REv.
669 (1986). See also Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968),
(citing Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943)).
56 Wetzel, supra note 23, at 133.
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bought and sold corporate securities within a six-month ("short swing") period.57
Therefore, if an insider trades within the six-month period he is liable no matter
what his excuse for making the trades.
D. Let's Stop Calling Them "Profits"
"Profit" calculations for insider trading are formulated so as to insure that
the highest amount of money will be disgorged from the insider. For purposes of
finding a violation under Section 16(b), it is irrelevant whether the purchase
precedes the sale or vice versa.8 As the Second Circuit stated, "the only rule
whereby all possible profits can surely be recovered is that of lower price in, highest
price out within six months.,
59
However, no such definition of "profit" can be found in any other
accounting or economic theory. In essence, the statute allows recovery of much
more than the real, taxable gains made by the defendant. This is a severely punitive
result especially when the defendant had no scienter or criminal culpability.
Contrariwise, a defendant with criminal intent in a Rule 1 Ob-5 case can be fined and
"profits" are calculated in a traditional accounting context.
To facilitate this maximum "profit" calculation, Section 16(b) does not even
combine all of the transactions within a six-month period to determine whether an
insider has a cumulative profit.6° Instead, it matches the absolute lowest purchase
prices with the actual highest sales prices to calculate the moneys to be repaid. As
a result, an insider61 could actually have a cumulative loss during a given six-month
trading period and still be required to pay "profits" back to the corporation. The
following example illustrates this point.
57 Id.
58 See 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).
'9 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239; see also Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1951).
60 Taylor, supra note 26, at 1317.
61 The effectiveness of Section 16(b) regarding a 10% beneficial owner is not as concrete
as the other statutory insiders. A beneficial owner may be liable under Section 16(b) only
if he owned more than 10% of the stock at the time of the purchase and at the time of the
sale. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 419 (1972).
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Assume that an insider enters into the following transactions:
1) Buys 100 shares on 1/2/00 @ $100/share
2) Buys 100 shares on 1/12/00 @ $70/share
3) Sells 100 shares on 1/21/00 @ $120/share
4) Sells 100 shares on 3/2/00 @ $75/share
5) Sells 100 shares on
3/3/00 @ $105/share
6) Buys 100 shares on
4/1/00 @ $110/share
7) Buys 100 shares on
4/3/00 @ $90/share
8) Sells 100 shares on
5/2/00 @ $150/share
When calculating the punitive damages owed in the above transactions, the
purchases and sales which produce the highest spread are put together,
notwithstanding whether the sale preceded the purchase or the purchase preceded
the sale. Therefore, the "profit" calculations of the insider's transactions are as
follows:
100 @ $ 70 (#2)
100 @ $ 90 (#7)
100 @ $100 (#1)
100 @ $110 (#6)
Sales
100 @ $150 (#8)
100 @ $120 (#3)
100 @ $105 (#5)
100 @ $ 75 (#4)
Under this scenario, the statutory "profit" made by the insider during these
transactions is $11,500, whereas his actual, taxable and accounting profit would be
$8,000. This larger amount is what the insider is required to repay under Section
16(b). This is a system which no longer needs to exist when Section 10(b) allows
a comprehensive look at culpability. The Smolowe and Gratz cases were decided
before Rule lOb-5 litigation developed. The facts in these cases should turn on
intent - not strict liability.
E. The Appropriate Role of § 16(a)
Section 16(a)62 provides for a thorough system to facilitate disclosures of








information regarding insider holdings and trades.63 This information produces
insight for the market as a whole and the regulatory authorities as to appropriate
conduct by insiders. Corporations and their counsel have developed extensive
training and counseling systems to admonish affected persons of the illegality of
insider trades and proper techniques under which such trades may be made. 64
Attendant publicity about those prosecuted for such violations as well as a vigorous
SEC enforcement division using Rule 10(b)5 65 give society adequate protection
against these evils.
F. Omitted Defendants
Section 16(b) is underinclusive in that it does not include all employees
who may have valuable inside information and trade.66 A non-officer employee or
outside consultant to a corporation who makes a large, real accounting profit within
a six-month statutory period will not be required to disgorge profits under Section
16(b).
Section 16(b) also is underinclusive with regard to the type of securities
that are applicable to Section 16(b). Section 16(b) only applies to insiders of
corporations whose equity securities are registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67 The requirements of Section 12 mean that those
are large publicly held corporations. However, many companies are not registered
or not required to register under Section 12.68 Section 16(b) has no application to
these corporations and has no ability to discourage officers of these entities from
engaging in insider trading, a material weakness of the statute. In short, the same
conduct by the CEOs of two major corporations is treated differently.
63 Section 16(a) provides that a person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of equity security, or who is an officer or director of the issuer of the
security, must file a registration statement with the Commission within ten days after they
become a beneficial owner, officer, or director. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
64 Such cautionary memoranda also are required by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 99 Stat. 1264.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1997).
66 Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323.
67 Section 12(b) requires registration when a security becomes listed on a national securities
exchange. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994). Section
12(g) requires registration when the issuer has more than $1,000,000 in assets and at least
500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1994). But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1997)
(modifying Section 12(g)(1) to exempt from the registration requirement any issuer with
assets not exceeding $10,000,000).
68 Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323.
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Another problem is the statutorily defined transaction period. Section 16(b)
only applies to sales and purchases which both occur within a six-month period.69
Congress apparently believed that the six-month period would capture virtually all
transactions in which there might be an opportunity to profit from the use of inside
information.7 However, despite Congress' belief, the application of Section 16(b)'s
statutory transaction period produces an overinclusive effect. Since the period does
not inquire into whether a trader, in fact, used inside information, but instead sets
an arbitrary time period during which profits are prohibited, 7 traders are prosecuted
even if they do not trade on inside information, so long as they traded within the
six-month period.
Furthermore, Congress' reasons for creating the six-month period do not
seem to be relevant in today's markets. In 1934, six months was an adequate time
period with which to make sure that the inside information became known to the
general public. Today's extraordinary era of instantaneous mass communication
calls for a considerably shorter time period. Furthermore, there is a large corps of
market analysts who are vigilant in their search for information about the
companies which they follow. These developments, together with SEC rules
requiring companies to provide more forward looking information, 72 make it
substantially more difficult to keep information secret for extended periods of time.
The statutorily defined period is too long as it stands, and as such, poses a problem
in its application.
G. Omitted Plaintiffs
The Securities and Exchange Commission has no authority to enforce §
16(b) as it does with other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.73 By only
allowing the corporation or individual shareholder plaintiff to sue, Congress created
enforcement through "private attorneys general. 7 4 Now that § 10(b) and its Rule
69 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).
70 Taylor, supra note 26, at 1324 & n.35. (citing to the Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part II: Reform
of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW. 1087, 1130 (1987)).
71 Id. at 1323. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
72 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997)) and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. Co. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
77p, 77bb (West 1997 and Supp. 1999)).
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
74 Coffee, supra note 55, at 669.
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10(b)5 have been interpreted so broadly, it is time to place the burden where it
belongs: on the SEC.
Section 16(b) also is unlike other statutes in that the contemporaneous
ownership requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 does not apply.75 Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.1 states that, in a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders to
enforce the right of a corporation which has failed to enforce the right, the
complaint must be verified and allege "(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or a
member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains. 76 In a
Section 16(b) action all that is required is that the shareholder be an owner of the
security at the time he initiates the suit and maintain that status throughout the
pendency of the lawsuit.
77
In reality, there are situations in which the corporation changes its identity.
For instance, in a case in which the defendant corporation merged with another
corporation during litigation, the question arose whether the plaintiff shareholder
still had standing to sue for the short swing transactions done by those associated
with the subsidiary. 8
In that case, the Court interpreted the category of shareholders involved in
initiating a Section 16(b) suit, as those who have a "financial stake" in the litigation.
A stockholder of the issuer claimed that there were shares traded in violation of
Section 16(b). However, that corporation was acquired by Viacom and the
shareholder's stock in the issuer had been exchanged.79
The court held that the shareholder could maintain the suit even though the
company's stock no longer existed since it was acquired by another corporation.80
The Court discussed Congress' intent to put "a private-profit motive behind the
uncovering of this kind of leakage of information, [by making] the stockholders
71 FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1. A complaint by the shareholder against the corporation shall allege
that (1) plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction in question; and
(2) the action is not a "collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States
which it would not otherwise have." Id. Additionally, complaint shall allege "with
particularity" the reason(s) why the shareholder is taking action and reasons(s) why she
represents the interst of "similarly situated" shareholders or members. Id.
76 Fed. R. Civ. Pro Rule 23.1 (West Group 1997).
77 Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979).
78 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1991).
79 Id. at 118-19.
80 Id. at 129.
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[its] policemen,8 and quoted draftsman Thomas G. Corcoran, while testifying
before the House committee, who stated that Congress could be confident that
Section 16(b) would be enforced because the enactment of the statute would "[say]
to all of the stockholders of the company, 'you can recover any of this profit for
your own account, if you find out that any such transactions are going on.' ,8
2
The intent behind the provision that not only the corporation may initiate
a suit, but that a stockholder would be able to take action if the corporation fails to
do so, stems from the premise that if an officer, director or more than ten percent
shareholder chooses to violate Section 16(b), he must be aware that someone with
a profit motive will try to find out and initiate a lawsuit.83 It appears that Congress,
by granting standing of this considerable magnitude, wanted to ensure that many
possible plaintiffs would be able to initiate a suit if needed, in order to deter insider
trading of this sort.
In Gollust,84 the Court held that because the plaintiff received shares in the
parent corporation, he still maintained a financial interest in the outcome even after
the merger. The court concluded that any finding of wrongdoing by the insider
would force them to turn in profits to the new corporation. Thus, the shareholder
who now had an interest in the new corporation, would stand to profit, albeit
indirectly.85
This decision may limit the broad standing requirement by excluding those
who are security holders of an issuer involved in a cash-out merger.86 After a cash-
out merger the shareholder no longer has a financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation, as required by the Gollust Court. Due to the fact that the shareholder
could not profit from the recoupment of the money, he should be denied standing.87
81 Id. at 124-25; (citing Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1934) (testimony of Thomas
G. Corcoran)).
82 Id. at 125 & n.7.
83 Gollust, 501 U.S. at 125 & n.7.
84 501 U.S. 115 (1991), aff'g, 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990).
85 See id. at 112.
86 See Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 41.
87 See id. at 42
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IV. BALANCING THE SCALES - ARE THERE STILL MEANINGFUL "BENEFITS" TO §
16(B)?
While it is the position of this paper that there are major problems
associated with Section 16(b) and its enforcement, it seems also that the points
initially thought of as benefits to preventing insider trading can also be considered
problems. For example, while the concept that a shareholder's attorney can be
awarded his fees under Section 16(b) sounds beneficial because it may help
encourage a reluctant shareholder to bring a Section 16(b) suit against an insider,
such fees steer the focus away from preventing real culpable insider trading, and
promote unethical dealings between client and lawyer.
Second, while strict liability seems like a benefit if insiders are deterred
from engaging in insider trading because of the ease with which they may be found
to be in violation of Section 16(b), the Act only includes the statutorily defined
insiders and on a higher level corporate leaders and applies even if the defendant
did not trade on insider information.
V. THE CAMEL UNDER THE TENT: UNFORSEEN RESULTS OF SECTION 16(B)
A. The Setting: How Fees are Set:
There are several proper methods for attorneys to obtain fees for their legal
services, the major ones being through a fee agreement or retainer or on a
contingent fee basis. A retainer is the advancement of payment to an attorney for
his legal services. Contingency fees are based on the premise that the client will
pay the attorney a percentage of the recovery if the outcome is successful. Such an
agreement includes the work done by the attorney, but does not usually cover the
out-of-pocket cost of litigation, for example court costs and discovery expenses.
The client remains ultimately liable for these expenses. The overlap with
champerty, the practice where the attorney seeks to recover his fee for legal services
and the expenses he incurred by advancing the cost of the law suit himself, are
clear.
An attorney's fee may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which
his service is rendered, except in a matter for which a contingent fee is prohibited,
such as criminal and domestic cases.88 A contingent fee agreement must be in
writing and state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
88 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, EC 2-20 (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (d) (1998).
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percentage that will be paid to the lawyer in the event of a settlement, trial or
appeal. Other expenses are to be added from the recovery. s9 Contingent fee
agreements are permitted in the civil context. However, the advancement of
expenses is precluded in many jurisdictions. 9°
Under traditional rules, the company pays the plaintiffs attorney's fees
when the attorney confers a benefit on it in the form of the recovery of profits from
the insider. 91 It is considered a windfall for the corporation.92 In one case, the
corporation recovered nothing, but still had to pay the attorney's fees, even though
no benefit was conferred upon it.
9 3
There are generally two ways to calculate the attorney's fees. The first is the
"lodestar method," which compensates the attorney at his or her hourly rate, based
on the time expended on the action.9 4 This method of compensation has the
drawback of encouraging the attorney to work more leisurely, thus running up the
fee. Also, if there are disputes regarding the hourly rate of billing, the court will
essentially have to determine whether the rate is fair and whether the time spent on
the matter is reasonable, which uses up already scarce judicial resources.95 Another
drawback is that if the attorney spends enough time to find the violation and a
plaintiff merely sends a demand letter prompting the insider to pay the profits
without further action by the attorney, his hourly rate may not compensate for his
time and effort. (The time the attorney spends searching for a security law
violation is not attributable to the company that receives the benefit.) 96 This takes
away the incentive for the attorney to monitor Section 16(b) violations, which is not
what Congress had in mind when it wrote Section 16(b).97 However, this method
may be more fair to the corporation, especially if the amount of legal work is not
89 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.5 (c) (1998).
90 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of
Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of
General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REv. 425, 443 (1988).
9' See Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 1978).
9' See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).
93 See id. See also Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964).
94 See e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated after remand 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1976).
9' John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 38.
96 See id.




Another method of compensating attorneys for their efforts is to award
them a percentage of the corporation's recovery.9" Often, there is a recovery for the
corporation, and the attorneys receive a large fee award, often for a minimal amount
of work. 99 This is partially due to the way the statute is designed, since if all of the
elements are met, there is generally no defense and the insider will have to turn over
the profits.1 °'
The individual plaintiff and other shareholders usually receive a minimum
benefit in relation to the amount of the attorney fees.'01 While this has the effect of
encouraging attorneys to monitor and enforce Section 16(b) violations, which is
what Congress had in mind to police and deter insider trading, 10 2 the downside is
that it encourages the attorneys to seek out a violation and find a plaintiff merely
for the fees involved.10 3 This results in overenforcement and opportunism by
attorneys, which creates a negative image of the legal profession in the mind of the
public.
B. The Dilemma - Crossing The Line
Due to the relaxed standing requirement of Section 16(b), it has become a
widespread practice of attorneys to either solicit shareholders of the corporation in
which the short swing transaction occurred or to ask friends or family to purchase
securities of the corporation in order to obtain standing and have the attorney
provide their legal services. This rule creates an impetus for attorneys to pursue
private enforcement of the securities law."' 4
There is an incentive for the attorney to prosecute suits that may not be
meritorious or may be of little value to the shareholder or the company, simply to
stimulate attorney fees. 10 5 In many of these cases, the attorney's financial incentive
98 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 (1984).
99 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943).
1oo See generally Coffee, supra note 55 at 677-98.
10' See Smowlowe, 136 F.2d at 241.
'02 See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
103 See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956)
104 See Portnoy v. Gold Reserve Corp., 711 F.Supp. 565, 569-70 (E.D. Wash. 1989).
105 In Portnoy, a United States District Court, stressed the need for the attorney's role before
recovery of fees. The corporation already had begun an investigation into an alleged § 16(b)
violation by the time that the plaintiff shareholder's letter notifying the corporation of the
possible short swing transactions arrived. Id. at 566-67. The court noted that the
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is the sole motivation for enforcement of Section 16(b).
The attorney basically becomes an entrepreneur or a "bounty hunter," 06 not
just an enforcer for an aggrieved or injured client or a deterrent to illegal conduct.'0 7
This situation allows a chance of opportunism and overenforcement on the part of
the attorney. 0 8 The attorney generally has a low search cost in relation to the
amount of money that he or she can make from these cases. 09 There is no defense
to a violation, which basically makes this an ideal situation for the attorney. All the
attorney must do is find a violation and a plaintiff, prove the elements of Section
16(b), and he has a fee.
One could argue that if the attorney does not have a motive (a substantial
fee) to search out violations and enforce them on behalf of a client, who will do so?
Since most potential plaintiffs own stocks through mutual funds, where they
probably don't even know the names of the individual stocks, they will not take
action to enforce Section 16(b). 1"° It is likely that most small investors have no idea
that they can bring action against the insider. Even if the small investor were
aware, it is unlikely he would have the time, interest, or sophistication to do so.
This is especially so considering the small monetary benefit to the individual
shareholder.'' Shareholders with a substantial interest in a company rarely try to
corporation had informed the shareholder that it was pursuing the claim and waiting for a
determination on the exact amount to be recovered. Id. at 566. However, after the sixty-day
waiting period had expired the shareholder brought a derivative action to recover the illegal
short swing profit. Id. at 567.
A few days later, the corporation notified the shareholder that it had secured the
profits and settled the matter. Id. Thereafter the attorney for the shareholder requested the
court to award him attorney's fees in prosecuting the action. Portnoy, 711 F. Supp. at 567.
The court denied his claim, stating that "an award is equitable only if the attorney's services
were a substantial or motivating factor in the corporation's recovery in the illegal profit," and
in this case he was not because the corporation had informed the shareholder that it was
pursuing the alleged violation. Id. at 569.
'06 See 15 U.S.C. §78u-l(e) (1994). For SEC procedures relating to bounty hunter
provisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§201.61-201.68 (1997).
1'7 See generally Coffee, supra note 55.
108 id.
109 Id.
"o See generally Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O'Hagan and Private
Securities Litigation Reform: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1137, 1207-1217
(1998).
11' See generally id.
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enforce Section 16(b).' 12 If the corporation, which is more than likely aware of the
trades involved, does not care to take action against the insider, no one is left to do
SO.
113
However, new federal legislation allowing private causes of action for
contemporaneous trader involving insider trading provide a clear consistent
framework for enforcement in this field. The major problem of Section 16(b) or
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 is solved as well. Champerty is eliminated. The
defendant must have scienter, and the SEC or individual plaintiff is allowed to
recover if a violation of Rule 10(b)5 is proven. Thus, Section 16(b) has essentially
become moot, or at worst, much more of a problem than a solution.
VI. THE POOR PLAINTIFF
A. Where's the Money?
Since attorneys receive large amounts for their fees and the shareholder
who is supposed to be the one with an interest in the litigation usually does not
really increase his personal equity, is the purpose of this act being accomplished?.
The extreme disallocation of any proceeds can be extraordinary. In one
case the attorney was awarded $3,000 for fees and $78.98 for expenses to be paid
by the corporation." 4 The recovery against the defendants was $18,894.85.' The
plaintiffs were only benefitted by about $3 since they owned only 150 shares out
of 800,000.116
In another case, the plaintiff shareholder sought to increase his personal
equity by $1.10 if the Section 16(b) action was successful,"' 7 while if he were
unsuccessful he would be responsible for costs and expenses adding up to many
hundred times that amount.18 Subsequently, in a later action the attorney petitioned
the court for an allowance of 50 percent of the recovery." 9
112 See Magida, 231 F.2d at 847.
"' See id. at 848.
114 Smowlowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943).
115 Id. at 240.
116 id.
117 Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d. 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956).
118 Id.
1'9 Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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The court noted that the services rendered by the attorney were both
necessary and beneficial to the corporation; however, it was found that this amount
was excessive. As a result, the court granted an allowance of $12,000,
approximately one quarter of the total amount recovered, which it felt was fair and
adequate to cover his services. 2 °
It was argued that this would be unfair considering the discrepancy between
what the attorney received as a benefit versus what the actual plaintiff received.
However, in the Court's reasoning it stated that the corporate issuer is the one who
usually brings forth the action and only upon its refusal or delay does the
shareholder have the right to act.12 ' The Court reasoned that a stockholder who is
successful in maintaining a Section 16(b) action was entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees because it was the corporation which had received the benefit of the
attorney's work and, therefore, should pay for such a benefit.122 Since the
corporation is the one which has received the benefit, it must pay for the services.
An arguable question which arises is what is the purpose of having a
shareholder plaintiff? The only ones really benefitting are the corporation and the
private attorney who worked on the case when the corporation failed to do so. In
some cases the attorney is the only one who benefits because, while the corporation
may receive the proceeds of the short swing profit due to the work of the attorney,
it also has to pay out large sums for attorney's fees and costs.
For example, in one case a court granted the attorneys $750,000 in fees but
the amount recovered was $7,920,000.123 Originally, the attorneys petitioned for
$2,500,000; however, the court found this to be unreasonable. It decided that the
notion that a fee based primarily on a percentage of the recovery exceeded the
limits of reasonable compensation for the attorney's efforts. 124
It seems as though whether you are a bonafide shareholder or a friend who
has bought into the action, the court is not interested. As long as the corporation
receives a benefit from the attorney's work, the theory is that every shareholder
receives a benefit. An example of this is where a case settles before going to trial
and the attorney cannot even account for all of his time spent on the case. 25
120 Id. at 783.
121 id.
122 id.
123 Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
124 Id. at 163.
125 See id. at 164.
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When the issue of avoiding trial has arisen, the courts have been willing to
award more than one third the amount of recovery in attorney's fees simply because
the case settled. 126 One court awarded $10,000 in fees to attorneys in relation to
work done on the case, even though they could not show the actual amount of time
spent. 127 The court based its reasoning on the fact that the fees were reasonable and
fair, based on the results achieved by the intervention of counsel.
1 28
Also, under circumstances when the attorney has merely aided in the
discovery of short swing profits, attorney's fees have been awarded. In Gilson v.
Chock Full O'Nuts Corporation,129 the Second Circuit allowed an award to an
attorney who had merely brought the violation of Section 16(b) to the attention of
the corporation, who later brought suit.1 30 The case was appealed from the United
States District Court which dismissed the complaint for attorney's fees. The Court
of Appeals cited Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, which recognized that
reimbursement of attorney's fees was required by equitable considerations.
31
One of the problems with identifying champertous agreements is the
question of whose interest is being pursued. For example, when an attorney enters
into a contingent fee agreement the attorney is highly motivated personally to win
the case and receive a share of the judgment. If the client has paid the costs, the
attorney maintains the client's interest in pursuing the case, so that he may profit
only from judgment, but not be motivated to prosecute the action solely to obtain
his fee.
Technically in a champertous agreement, the attorney puts his interest first
because he has more at stake. Not only is the attorney trying to win the case to
receive his share for the work that he has performed, but he needs to recoup the
money that he has put out for costs. Therefore, the shareholder becomes the vehicle
through which the attorney initiates the case and recovers fees.
In this latter arrangement, the shareholder is no longer relevant after the
case has begun, because the needs which the attorney seeks to address are his own.
126 Blau v. Kagan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92, 119, at 96,561 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 8, 1968).
127 id.
128 Id.
129 326 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
130 Id. at 248.
131 Id.
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This practice is held to be unethical. 3 2 The rules relating to ethics state that an
attorney shall not acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of action or litigation.133
It has been argued that the attorney has put himself in a position of primary interest
in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation that he is conducting for the
client, when he has based his fee on the success of the case.
In addressing this issue the courts have balanced the interests of the
corporation's many shareholders versus the self-seeking attorney. The Court in
Magida v Continental Can Company stated,
Presumably Congress is aware of the opportunity presented to
attorneys to suits for their benefit, but apparently it regards public
policy against proved and repeated violations of fiduciary
responsibility by corporate offices at the expense of the public
more detrimental to public good than the violation of generally
accepted ethics by attorneys.1
34
Thereby, it set the standard that champertous agreements would not be a defense to
Section 16(b) actions, but, if proven, would only be pertinent to the determination
of the amount of the award granted to the attorney. Since courts are willing to
award attorney's fees even in cases where counsel has acted unethically, 135 it is
possible to see how attorneys may take great steps to become involved in Section
16(b) actions. After all, even if they act inappropriately, their actions are not a
defense to the action. Further, the only harm they may suffer is a reduction in the
amount of fees they receive. Tragically, the issue of impropriety becomes
irrelevant.
B. Solicitation
One key problem with Section 16(b) is that solicitation of legal
representation by an attorney from existing holders of securities violates long-
standing established principles. 136 The rules on professional responsibility state that
a lawyer shall not, except in some permitted forms of advertising, recommend
employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a
132 See generally Gabaldon, supra note 88, at 466-69.
133 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.8() (1998); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1981).
134 Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
131 See. id.
136 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981).
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layperson who has not sought his advice regarding the employment of a lawyer.137
When this issue has arisen, the judicial attitude has been that the ends of
Section 16(b) enforcement justify means that may involve technical improprieties.
In fact, courts have uniformly held that an attorney's solicitational acts may be
grounds for disciplinary action, but will not suffice as a defense for a Section 16(b)
action.
131
Thus, attorneys who read a report filed with the SEC may try to solicit
those who own shares of the corporation to initiate an action, since it is the attorney
who receives a fair share of the recovery. Attorneys may even ask friends, family
or employees to buy shares, thus giving them standing, and the attorney
employment on the case.
In Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Incorporated,139 the court stated the policy for
such a conclusion
We do not suggest that counsel fees should be automatically
awarded to overzealous attorneys; nor do we want lawyers poring
over Section 16(a) reports as soon as they are made public to find
a cause of action before the corporation does and thereby collect
a fee. Reimbursement for information leading to corporate
recovery will be allowed only if the corporation has done nothing
for a substantial period of time after the suspect transactions and
its inaction is likely to continue. In this way, it is not speed but
careful investigation which will be rewarded, and the corporation
will have adequate opportunity to enforce its rights without
prodding from a stockholder. But if the corporation has been, and
is likely to be, inattentive to its rights, a portion of any recovery
should properly go to the stockholder for reimbursement of any
reasonable legal expenses."4
Another issue is that of soliciting an intimidated or co-conspirator
employee, family member or friend to buy into the action. While a lawyer may be
considered to have an attorney/client relationship with a close friend or relative
resulting merely from advice given, it is unlikely that "advice," in this context,
includes asking a friend or family member to buy into a cause of action. This type
137 id.
138 See Gabaldon, supra note 88 at n.87.
139 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968).
140 Id. at 473.
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of solicitation usually translates into the attorney acquiring an interest in the
litigation, since it is not the friend or relative who has any interest in the outcome
of the action. The attorney is the only one who really stands to benefit by receiving
his fees.
VII. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
It is argued that repeal is needed in this area of securities law enforcement
for three reasons. First, proper theories exist to meet Congress' intent. Second,
society needs to curb the excessive and unnecessary litigation that is rampant in this
area of the law. Third, the bench and bar should help to restore the badly tarnished
image of attorneys and the legal profession. In order to cause changes in this area
of the law, it is necessary to examine the circumstances that make it possible for
attorneys to indulge in unnecessary litigation merely to collect fees. These
circumstances involve the issue of standing of the plaintiff.
The standing requirements of Section 16(b) are quite broad in relating to
securities laws. This is evident by the fact that a person can obtain standing by
acquiring the stock after the alleged trade has taken place, and such a person does
not need to own any certain amount of shares to initiate the suit. One share of stock
is enough to confer standing.
1 4
'
Further, Section 16(b) states that "any security" will be adequate to confer
standing. 142 Examples of such securities include stocks, notes, warrants, bonds,
debentures, puts, calls and others. 143 The only restriction is currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
the issuance not exceeding nine months.'" Due to the ease with which a person can
become a party to the suit, amending the law may be the only alternative to cure the
ongoing abuse by plaintiff s attorneys.
There are several theories with which to amend Section 16(b). They
141 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 127 (1991).
142 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
143 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 408 & n.1 (3d ed. 1996)
(stating that "[t]he registration requirement [of securities] is set forth in section 12(g), 15
U.S.C. § 781(g) (1994)."). See generally Donald A. Scott, Checklist for Registration of
Securities under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 Bus. LAW. 1631
(1981).
'44 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
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include: (1) eliminating private causes of action, (2) banning contingent fees, or (3)
changing the category of possible plaintiffs by requiring them to be shareholders
at the time of the trade. In the alternative, the decision in United States v.
O'Hagan1 45 may set the standard, thus repudiating the need for Section 16(b) at all.
A. Eliminate Private Causes of Action?
Under Section 16(b) a shareholder may initiate a suit for insider trading
sixty days after notifying the corporation, if the corporation fails to act. By virtue
of this rule, all the shareholder has to do is wait the sixty days and then initiate his
suit to recover the short swing profits. Attorneys, as discussed in the section above,
use this time to investigate and research, all of which may lead to the discovery of
a violation of Section 16(b). They are compensated for all work done, which
facilitates the recovery of short swing profits.
In the best scenario to justify the lawyer's role, the corporation fails to act
within the sixty-day period and the attorney initiates the law suit, increasing the
amount of compensation he receives for the return of profits by the insider
proprietary figure. If an insider is taking advantage of his position and making
illegal trades, why not allow the interested shareholder to seek him out and make
him divulge any profits made?
While in theory this sounds ideal, reality is that the shareholder is usually
not the one with real interest in retrieving those profits. It is the attorneys who
facilitate the suit. They are the ones who profit from the initiation of a law suit. By
eliminating private causes of action, attorneys would not be able to take advantage
of the lenient standing requirement. There would be no involvement of private
attorneys for the sake of retrieving short swing profits.
While this approach may seem unfair, many other securities laws give the
enforcement of such laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section
16(b) is one law which Congress chose not to give such authority. Since 16(b)
requires the shareholder to notify the corporation first, Congress may have thought
that the issue would be settled internally by the corporation. The fact that it allowed
the shareholder to take action sixty days after notifying the corporation may have
been to simply put a threat on the corporation.
In many of the cases, when the corporation fails to take action within time
14' 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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allotted, and the shareholder initiates a suit, the case settles before litigation.46 This
may be a reflection of what was intended, a quick resolution if the corporation
failed to act on its own. The notion of plaintiff attorney's fees was never even
considered by Congress. There is no mention in Section 16(b) of attorney's fees.
The courts have developed their own standard for determining what are
reasonable attorney's fees. Had Congress known how widespread this practice of
receiving attorney's fees for private causes of action, it may have granted the SEC
the power to enforce Section 16(b) violations.
Another possibility is for Congress to allow the Securities and Exchange
Commission to enforce Section 16(b), instead of private plaintiffs. There are two
ways that this could be accomplished. The first method would be to simply allow
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce Section 16(b) instead
of private plaintiffs. If violations were pursued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission only, instead of private plaintiffs, there would be no attorney fees to
be collected. A flat percentage of the recovery, such as twenty percent, could be
paid out of the recovery to the Securities and Exchange Commission to fund the
enforcement. This would leave the corporation with the majority of the recovery,
although that fee may not cover the actual cost of recovery by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. This would eliminate the lucrative plaintiffs bar that has
developed in this area. The Securities and Exchange Commission would be as
aggressively motivated in seeking out violations as would a private attorney with
a monetary incentive. It also has the financial resources to do so.
Thus, the solution may lie in vesting the power to enforce Section 16(b)
violations in the SEC. By allowing the SEC to be the enforcer of such violations,
the shareholder would not have the burden of paying the costs of the suit in cases
where the corporation has failed to act. Furthermore, the SEC would not have a
personal stake in the outcome of the case. This may insure an unbiased
representation of the shareholder in retrieving short swing profits. Lastly, this is
another alternative which may cure ongoing abuse by attorneys.
'46 See DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL, 265 (6th ed. 1998)
(stating that usually, a favored defense tactic to obtain a dismissal of derivative actions is
to create a committee of "disinterested" directors. If, when this committee decides that it is
not in the "best interest of the corporation" to maintain this action brought forth by a
shareholder, it asks the court to dismiss the action. Therefore, in many cases settlement
results before litigation occurs.)
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B. Allow Champerty as a Complete Defense?
To allow a complete defense of champerty would defeat the purpose and
intent of Congress in effectuating the enforcement of Section 16(b). Even though
an individual plaintiff would not receive a large increase in the value of his or her
stock and the attorney would receive a significant amount, to allow otherwise would
control the enforcement of Section 16(b).
If Congress were to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 or Section 10(b)
contemporaneous trade standard, so the plaintiff must be the owner of any security
of the issuer at the time of the alleged insider trading and at the time that the suit is
instituted, it would solve a major weakness in the statute. This would make finding
a willing plaintiff more difficult since the number of possible plaintiffs is limited
to only those who had a genuine interest in the company, which would cut down on
the number of Section 16(b) actions undertaken. Also, this would reduce the
number of actions that were pursued only for the interest of the attorney who found
the violation, as it would require more work on the part of the attorney to find a
willing plaintiff.
In conclusion, if Section 16(b) were amended to grant the SEC the task of
enforcing Section 16(b) insider trading rather than private parties, this could well
cure the problem of overzealous attorneys.
Attorney's fees would still provide the main stimulus for enforcing Section
16(b), but it would now require the attorney to find a "real" plaintiff, not one who
purchased the stock after the short swing trading merely in order to benefit him or
herself. This would provide a balance between the opposing interests involved. The
attorney still has the opportunity to generate fees by pursuing Section 16(b)
violations, but this will further the intent of Congress in encouraging private
enforcement. The prosecution of Section 16(b) may drop slightly, but the ones not
pursued would be the type of actions to be discouraged. There will still be a large
recovery for the attorney, but he or she will have to travel further to reach it.
C. Change the Standing Tests?
Another requirement under Section 16(b) is that the plaintiff must be the
"owner of any security.' 47 The term "any" share has been found to mean at least
one share. 148 Other cases have held that there is no restriction on the number of
147 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
148 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 127 (1991).
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shares, the percentage of shares, or the value of the share(s). 49 This results in
potential plaintiffs with a very minimal interest in a company, who have the power
to enforce Section 16(b). 5 ' The requirement of allowing a plaintiff standing who
only owns a negligible number of shares seems unreasonable. To require more
shares or a larger percentage of shares would still allow small shareholders who are
truly aggrieved to enforce Section 16(b). The problem of how many shares
remains. However, the current requirements for standing creates a situation that
may be exploited to the detriment of the legal profession. The standing requirement
of a minimal number of shares combined with the requirement that the plaintiff
need only have an interest at the time the suit is instituted, has resulted in a situation
where attorneys can seek out a violation, find a plaintiff to buy a single share, and
enforce Section 16(b) solely to earn a fee.
D. Modify Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1?
A possible solution to cure the problem of attorney solicitation of current
shareholders and friends or family who purchase shares to obtain standing, may be
to require the shareholder to own their shares at the time of the alleged inside trade.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 states that, in a derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders to enforce the right of a corporation who has failed to enforce the
right, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege "(1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or a member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff
complains."' 5'
Modifying Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 could prevent the
fabricated cases which arise with overzealous attorneys. If the statute required
contemporaneous ownership then, only those stockholders who had shares in the
corporation at the time of the alleged trade would have standing, thus reducing the
number who would have standing.
This would eliminate the practice of attorneys soliciting friends or family
to buy into these actions. Shareholders who purchase shares of the corporation after
the alleged trade has taken place would not be able to bring suit on behalf of
themselves and the other shareholders.
Denying an after-the-fact shareholder the right to sue because he was not
a shareholder at the time the trade appeared does not contradict the policy behind
149 Id. at 123.
150 See id. at 125-26.
1'1 FED. RCIv. P.23.1.
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Section 16(b), which was designed to allow legitimate plaintiffs to initiate a suit for
the good of the corporation as a whole. The corporation thus remains the primary
beneficiary of the disgorged funds.
Thus, requiring plaintiffs to be shareholders at the time of the trade appears
to be the solution to attorney impropriety.
E. Eliminate Certain Types of Attorneys' Fees?
Section 16(b) does not specifically provide for the granting of attorney's
fees. Courts have held that fees are justified in the majority of cases, for several
reasons; first, fee awards may be the sole stimulus for the enforcement of Section
16,152 and second, if the corporation receives a recovery, a benefit has been
conferred on it, 153 and it should pay the reasonable value of the services that
resulted in the recovery.
This leaves the amount of the fees as the major issue. In Gilson v. Chock
Full ONuts, the court held that "equitable considerations require the corporation to
pay a reasonable attorney's fee.' ' 15 4 In Smolowe, the court found that "since in many
cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the sole
stimulus for the enforcement of Section 16(b), the allowance must not be too
niggardly."' 55 It appears that the attorney fees should be particular to each specific
case, since the work required for each one may differ as far as effort, difficulty, and
time expended. It would be unfair to deny an attorney payment for his services that
conferred a benefit on another.
This would chill the enforcement of Section 16(b). However, the fees
should be reasonable (in other words, not excessive) in light of the circumstances
of each particular case. Shareholders generally do not have the money to institute
the suit. Attorneys have become the force behind the initiating and pursuing of
these suits. In cases where attorneys have asked a friend or co-worker to buy shares
to obtain standing, it would be unlikely for their attorney to then ask for a retainer
to pursue the case that they created in the first place.
Another solution to the problem of attorney interest may be to eliminate
contingent fee arrangements. If a shareholder wished to investigate a possible
152 Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
153 See id. at 474.
154 Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964).
155 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).
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Section 16(b) violation, he would have to obtain the services of an attorney through
a retainer agreement. This would eliminate the solicitation by attorneys who ask
friends to purchase shares to secure standing, since those who purchased the shares
to allow the attorney to pursue the case would not be willing to pay for the suit.
This would eliminate abuses by attorneys who have a self-interest in
Section 16(b) actions, but not affect those shareholders who honestly want to
initiate a suit based upon a Section 16(b) violation. In this circumstance, the
shareholder who has discovered a possible short swing trade would still be able to
pursue the case.
Moreover, the court has the final determination on whether to award
attorney's fees. In most cases, only where the attorney's work has been a motivating
factor in the recovery of profits and where their work has substantially benefitted
the corporation will the court award attorney's fees, thereby placing conditions on
whether to grant fees for the work performed.
The court also has in its discretion the power to reduce the amount of the
fees sought by the attorney who litigated the action.15 6 In cases where a compromise
has been reached as to the amount the insider will furnish to the corporation, the
parties can stipulate to the dismissal of the action and attorney's fees. Although this
amount is not binding on the court, the court may ask the SEC for an opinion on the
appropriateness of the award requested.
Ordinarily, the SEC makes a recommendation as to how much it believes
the attorney should receive in fees. In some cases the court does not follow either
proposal. For example, in Blau v. Brown & Western Nuclear, Incorporated,157 the
parties stipulated to an amount of $11,250 for attorney's fees.158 The SEC
recommended $3,800 or ten percent of the recovery and the court awarded
$7,500.159 In another case, the parties agreed to $3,000 in attorney's fees. 160 While
the SEC suggested $1,000, the court awarded $1,800, twenty percent of the
recovery.161
156 See generally Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"' Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,263, at 97,253 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1968).
158 id.
159 Id.
160 Blau v. Berkey Photo, Inc., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,264, at 97,255 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
4, 1968).
161 Id. at 197,256.
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This area presents difficulty because a set formula would be unfair to some
attorneys, and a percentage of the recovery would be unfair to a corporation for
what little legal work was done. The matter of fees is individual to each case and
they are often excessive, but the solution is for courts to use an increasing
percentage of the recovery based on the time and the difficulty of its collection.
The court would have to determine what a reasonable plaintiff in the field of
securities litigation would pay an attorney on an hourly basis and estimate the
reasonable number of hours that an experienced attorney would need to complete
the recovery.
The reasonable hourly rate would be calculated based on the geographical
area, skill, difficulty of the work and factors as those found in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. This option has several drawbacks. First, the court would be
put in the position of monitoring the current market rate for attorney fees, which
would take up judicial time. Theoretically, the required reasonableness of the fees
based on the amount of the work actually done should reduce the number of
attorneys who pursue a Section 16(b) violation simply to run up excessive fees.
This may reduce the incentive for private enforcement of these violations, but if
there were truly an un-addressed violation, an attorney would still be able to be paid
at his usual hourly rate, as long as it was reasonable.
It seems arguable whether the courts have truly balanced the windfall to
plaintiff's attorneys versus the small recovery for the shareholder. One theory
concerning the contingent fees is that only cases are brought which have merit. 162
Attorneys will assess the chance of the suit's success before instituting the suit,
based on the premise that in the event that it is not successful, they will not be paid.
However, the reoccurring danger exists of whose interests are being pursued.
The courts have effectively addressed this issue and placed the value of
recovery in Section 16(b) cases higher than the self-interested attorney. It is not to
say that the impropriety of plaintiff's attorneys does not exist, but the courts have
decided that the inherent goal of Congress in enacting Section 16(b) for the good
of the public outweighs all else.
However, the elimination of contingent fee arrangements would not
disregard Congressional intent. Section 16(b)'s silence on the matter of attorney's
fees, leads to the conclusion that Congress may have thought that since the law was
written bestowing strict liability on those who violate it, there would not be much
litigation. They may have thought that if the insider did not turn over any profit
162 See Gabaldon, supra note 88, at 459.
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made within the six-month period, the corporation would ensure that the profit was
disgorged. However, because attorneys' fees are not mentioned in the statute, leads
to an argument that they should not be awarded.
F. Eliminate Section 16(b) Altogether?
Section 16(b) has been criticized for several reasons. 163 The first is that it
only applies to a defined group of directors, officers, and beneficial owners.'64
Section 16(b) does not apply to others within the company who may have access
to valuable information. It also applies to the defined group, who may not even
have access to information, but may still be penalized for trades not motivated by
inside information.
Second, Section 16(b) applies only to insiders of equity securities registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 165 It does not apply to insiders of
corporations that are not required to register, even though those insiders may
engage in short swing trading. 66 Another criticism of Section 16(b) is that it does
not require an insider to use inside information, but only considers whether the
trades were within a six-month period and whether a profit may be calculated.
Actually, this discourages insiders from owning securities issued by their
company. 167 Contrariwise, it does not affect trades that are outside the six-month
window, even if they were motivated by inside information. 68
One possible solution is to eliminate Section 16(b). There are other
sources169 which prohibit the use of inside information in securities trading, most
of which are more efficient and fair to both the insiders and the trading public.
Two of these are Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5. 7° Section 10(b) is a
163 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1318-19.
'64 See id. at 1322-26. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
165 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
166 See id.
167 See Taylor, supra note 26, at n.34.
168 Id. at 1324.
169 See id. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1997).
170 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that, "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange -- to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on the securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
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general fraud provision, which in conjunction with Rule 10(b)5 prohibits the use of
material inside information when trading securities, until that inside information has
been made available to the public.
These provisions apply to all interstate securities sales and purchases,
regardless of the time frame, and not just to corporations that are required to
register under the Securities Act of 1933.'
An insider violates Section lOb-5 if he trades in the securities issued by his
company on the basis of material information that is not available to the public.72
This section applies notjust to traditional insiders such as officers and directors, but
to people who may have access to inside information by having an indirect
connection with the company, such as attorneys, accountants, and others who are
temporarily connected with the corporation.173 These people are considered
fiduciaries.17
4
In order to be found in violation of Rule I 0(b)5, an insider must have been
in a fiduciary relationship with corporation.1 75 Until recently, this meant that the
person had to have a relationship with the company or the shareholders, thus
establishing the duty. 76
In 1980, the Supreme Court found that a printer, who traded on nonpublic
information gained in conjunction with his employment, had no fiduciary
relationship that required him to disclose information. 177
In 1997 the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. O'Hagan. 178
There, an associate in a law firm, retained to represent a company in an acquisition,
became aware that a major tender offer was forthcoming. The associate purchased
options in the securities in the corporation he acquired and made a substantial
profit. The associate was convicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, mail
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
171 See id.
172 Taylor, supra note 26, at 1328-29.
173 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
174 Id.
75 See id. at 617-18.
176 See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
177 See id. at 235.
178 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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fraud, and money laundering. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
because it found that the associate had no relation to the corporation and, therefore,
had no duty to it. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that even though the
associate had no duty to the corporation, he still had a duty to his law firm, even
though it had resigned from the case before the offers were conducted.179
This 'misappropriation' theory holds that a person commits fraud 'in
connection with' a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. In lieu of
premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between a company insider and
purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information. 18
0
By comparison, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 concentrate on singular
securities, while Section 16(b) focuses on controlling a particular class of
transactions.
The Court also noted that an insider who secretly converts the principal's
information for personal gain, defrauds the principal. Further, the next requirement
that needs to be proven, that the trade was "in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security," is satisfied when without disclosure to the principal, the insider uses
the information to purchase or sell securities."' Even more noteworthy, is that the
holding includes not only officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of the
corporation, but also attorneys, accountants, and others who temporarily become
fiduciaries of the corporation. 82
In the Section 16(b) situation, where an insider uses information he
obtained due to his position and profits, he is deemed to have defrauded the
corporation because there was a certain relationship of trust and confidence between
the shareholders of the corporation and the insider. Therefore, the corporation, as
well as the investing public, are harmed by his actions. It is this reason that the 1934
Congress enacted Section 16(b) in the first place, to try to preserve this sense of
trust. When the insider uses this information to purchase or sell securities without
informing the corporation, (including all shareholders) the second element is met,
179 See id. at 653.
180 Id. at 652.
181 Id. at 656.
182 Id. at 652. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
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that of "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."
In essence, the Rule 10(b)5 statute now is held to condemn (1) using of any
deceptive device, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in
contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission. 8 3 The misappropriation
theory permits the imposition of liability to a person who trades in securities for
their personal benefit.184 By using material, confidential information without first
disclosing it to the public, the insider breaches the duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, he owes to the principal.185
With United States v. O'Hagan,1 86 the Court may have declared the final
word on all insider trading. There may no longer be a need for two standards. All
inside traders can be dealt with under the misappropriation theory. The Court held
that criminal liability under Section 10(b) may be predicated on the
misappropriation theory.
Thus, the advantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to control
insider trading makes it easier to focus on the facts of an individual situation, rather
than finding a whole class of securities trades improper. This would allow the
plaintiff (or the Securities and Exchange Commission) to determine whether the
trades were actually motivated by inside information. This has the advantage of
allowing short swing trading by insiders when the trades are not motivated by inside
information, but on personal financial situations, such as family situations, other
investment opportunities, or unexpected bills, etc. These sections also have the
advantage of not being applicable only to public corporation or statutorily defined
insiders, since the laws are applicable to more trades which would advance
Congress' intent in reducing insider trading.
One disadvantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to combat short
swing insider trading is that it is more difficult to prove liability, which, in turn,
makes for more expensive and time consuming litigation, thereby using up already
strained judicial resources. Another drawback is that Rule 10(b)5 does not impose
liability for trading on inside information unless there is a breach of fiduciary duty.
This requirement would make it more difficult to prosecute short swing insider
trading, but it is possible that the statute could be changed slightly to accommodate
this.
183 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651.
184 See id. at 652.
185 See id.
186 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Insider trading continues to be an issue today. Those insiders who transact
in short sales and who do not divulge their profits to the corporation are sought out
and forced to return the profits. Whether it is a shareholder of the corporation who
initiates the suit or an overzealous attorney who finds out about the trade and
encourages a friend to purchase the security to obtain standing, one thing is clear,
the insider will forfeit the profits if he violates Section 16(b).1 87
Section 16(b)' 88 permits litigation merely for the sake of attorneys' fees,
and it may not be as effective as other statutes in deterring and monitoring insider
trading. While it is clear that this area of the law needs to be changed, the question
of exactly how to change it without defeating the intent of Congress regarding the
enforcement is a difficult one.
One key method of controlling excessive litigation would be to allow the
Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce Section 16(b),18 9 which would
remove the incentive for attorneys to aggressively pursue violations.
Another method would be to eliminate Section 16(b)' 90 entirely and use
other statutes already in place to control short swing insider trading.
Amending Section 16(b)'9 to eliminate private causes of action, contingent
fees or adding the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.1192 to this section may also help. It has been argued that allowing the SEC to
initiate suits where the corporation has failed to, may be a solution which would
solve many of the existing problems. The SEC could pursue these suits, thereby
eliminating the reward of large sums of the returned profits to the attorney. In the
alternative, O'Hagan193 may become the standard in cases dealing with insider
trading.
Whatever the final result may be, there continues to be an ongoing problem
of attorney impropriety in relation to Section 16(b) actions. If the intent of the





192 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
193 See supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
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Congress was to restore the integrity of the stock market and eliminate insider
trading, then the O'Hagan94 decision may be the best solution.
This paper has examined the statutory section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 16(b),1 95 and attorney impropriety, an unforeseen issue which arose
due to the relaxed standing requirements. The courts have weighed this problem
with the overall purpose of Section 16(b) and found in favor of public policy. The
reward to attorneys who do the job that should have been done by the corporation
is too large a price to pay for the "benefit" conferred on the corporation and its
shareholders.
194 id.
195 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 1994.
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